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Note
Proportional Union or Paper Confederacy?
JENNIFER KARR
American Founders worked tirelessly to end the lack of representation
colonists had faced under British rule. The Constitution requires that each
state be apportioned a proportional number of representatives in the
House of Representatives. Throughout the first 120 years of the nation’s
history, the size of the House increased in proportion to population.
Though population continued to grow exponentially, the Apportionment
Act of 1911 limited the House to 435 representatives. One hundred years
later, the population has increased by nearly 220 million, but the number
of representatives in the House remains stunted at 435. This mismatched
growth and stiltedness results in greatly disparate representation in the
federal government between residents of neighboring states, as well as
inaccurate outcomes in federal elections.
This Note argues that the Founders’ goal of proportionality in
representation should be striven for in four ways. First, repealing the limit
on representatives in the Apportionment Act of 1911 should be
accompanied by a new formula for determining the number of
representatives apportioned to each state that resembles the formula used
in other western countries. Second, we should change the formula for
determining how many representatives each state will receive to a method
previously used, which lacks all bias. The second two changes I propose
are geared towards fairer presidential elections. First, each state should
elect to split Electoral College votes in order to better represent the
choices of the electorate. Second, the Twelfth Amendment requirement that
in the event of no Electoral College winner the vote must go to the House
should be repealed. Enacting these changes will result in a better
represented electorate, which will more closely resemble the Founders’
vision.
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Proportional Union or Paper Confederacy?1
JENNIFER KARR*
I. INTRODUCTION
The current method of representative apportionment in the United
States results in wide chasms between average district sizes in each state.
For example, Montana has only one district, consisting of its entire
population of 994,416.2 Conversely, Rhode Island’s two districts contain
527,624 people each.3 That means that a voter in Rhode Island is worth
1.88 times that of a voter in Montana. When Montana challenged this
apportionment in 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against the state,
finding that granting Montana a second representative (by taking away a
representative from Washington) would actually increase the relative
deviation from ideal district size in both states.4 With a statutory cap at 435
representatives in the House of Representatives, such disparities are
unavoidable.
Not only does this statutory cap result in voters in some states counting
as more than voters in other states, but it skews the results of presidential
elections. Many more people cast votes for president than any other type of
representative.5Apportionment affects the amount of representation each
state has in Congress, and it controls how many Electoral College votes
each state receives.6 Rhode Island, a state with 1,052,567 residents,
1
During the Constitutional Convention Debates, James Madison warned that lack of proportional
representation would result in a “paper confederacy.” Rule of Representation in the First Branch of the
Legislature [29 June] 1787, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/0110-02-0049 [http://perma.cc/K9Y7-KH2B] (last visited May 2, 2015).
*
University of Connecticut School off Law, J.D. Candidate 2016; University of Central Florida,
M.F.A. Creative Writing, 2013. First, I would like to thank my family for their love and support. I
would especially like to thank Professor Douglas Spencer, for his thorough and insightful comments
and suggestions, as well as his support, in writing this Note. Finally, I would like to thank my
colleagues on the Connecticut Law Review for their thoughtful feedback and editing.
2
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT: 2010
CENSUS BRIEFS 2 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-08.pdf [http://perma.cc/
FJ6R-N5QQ].
3
Id.
4
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 462 (1992).
5
See, e.g., Drew Desilver, Voter Turnout Always Drops Off for Midterm Elections, but Why?,
PEW RES. CTR. (July 24, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/24/voter-turnoutalways-drops-off-for-midterm-elections-but-why/ [http://perma.cc/X537-HWB2] (noting that fewer
votes have been cast in midterm elections since 1840).
6
What Is the Electoral College?, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, http://www.archives.gov/federalregister/electoral-college/about.html [http://perma.cc/DB5P-ZHZQ] (last visited May 13, 2015).
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received a total of four Electoral College votes in 2010. Montana, on the
other hand, with a resident population of 989,415, only 63,152 less than
Rhode Island, received three Electoral College votes.8
Among the reasons this apportionment is problematic is that, while the
Senate was created as part of The Great Compromise to give small states
equal representation in Congress, the House of Representatives was formed
to give states proportional representation.9 The proportionality of House
representation must be questioned when a vote in Rhode Island is worth
1.88 times that of a vote in Montana. The single House representative in
Montana is expected to know, understand, and act on the needs of nearly
one million people, whereas each representative from Rhode Island need
only advocate for a little over 525,000 people. Further, Montana and
Rhode Island are vastly different in size and population density. Montana
is 145,545.8 square miles, with only 6.8 people per square mile.10 Rhode
Island, on the other hand, is 1,033.81 square miles with 1,018.1 people per
square mile.11A Rhode Island representative has to account for only
525,000 people who live within close proximity to one another, whereas a
Montana representative must serve almost twice as many people in a state
that is nearly 141 times the size of Rhode Island. Montana’s population is
94% that of Rhode Island, yet it receives only 75% of the voting power of
Rhode Island in presidential elections.
The problem does not end there. Not only must Congress fix interstate
apportionment, but the states must each change how their electors vote in
the Electoral College to better reflect the preferences of all voters.
This Note explores the history of apportionment in the United States
and argues that an increase in Representatives in the House is necessary in
order to preserve proportional representation. Further, this Note suggests
splitting Electoral College votes to give each state a greater chance of
being adequately represented and the U.S. electorate an increased
likelihood of electing the presidential candidate of its choice.
Part II discusses the history and current state of U.S. interstate
apportionment. Part III delves into the problems with the current system,
and Part IV offers a solution to these problems. Part V discusses
improvements that should be made to the Electoral College and Twelfth
Amendment, and Part VI applies a solution to the 2000 presidential
election in order to show how the result could have been different. Finally,
7

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 2, at 2.
Id.
9
See infra note 22. For context, note that the Senate deviation, as of 2010, was 66.1.
10
State and County QuickFacts: Montana, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/30000.html [http://perma.cc/Z4CP-S4GQ] (last visited May 11, 2015).
11
State and County QuickFacts: Rhode Island, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.cen
sus.gov/qfd/states/44000.html [http://perma.cc/FH2X-CBG5] (last visited May 11, 2015).
8
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Part VII concludes by reiterating the importance of proportionality and
accuracy in apportionment.
II. HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF APPORTIONMENT
Since the founding of the United States, disagreement over how to
conduct the apportionment process has led to somewhat varied, and
arguably arbitrary, outcomes. The Constitution provides only four
requirements: (1) there cannot be more than one representative for every
thirty thousand individuals;12 (2) each state must be given at least one
representative;13 (3) House districts may not cross state lines;14 and (4)
“[r]epresentatives shall be apportioned among the several States according
to their respective numbers.”15 These requirements are at best a rough
guide, but we can look to history for their source and purpose.
A. The Great Compromise
The Continental Convention’s apportionment discussions leading up to
The Great Compromise16 have been described as “intense debates”17 and as
being marked by “nearly paralyzing bitterness.”18 Tension existed between
the more populated and less populated states, which were loath to
relinquish any power they might glean for themselves.19 For instance,
while James Madison, who hailed from the large state of Virginia, argued
for proportional representation,20 delegates from small states argued for
“equality of voices,” security for the small states, and “equivalent state
sovereignty.”21 On July 16, 1787 the Convention approved the
Compromise by a margin of only one vote, giving small states equal
representation in the Senate and large states proportional representation in
the House.22
12

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
Id.
14
Id.
15
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
16
The Great Compromise was a decision voted on by the Founders that provided for the House of
Representatives and the Senate. A Great Compromise, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artand
history/history/minute/A_Great_Compromise.htm [http://perma.cc/7UUL-UJG5].
17
MICHEL L. BALINSKI & H. PEYTON YOUNG, FAIR REPRESENTATION: MEETING THE IDEAL OF
ONE MAN, ONE VOTE 1–2 (1982).
18
Dan T. Coenen, The Originalist Case Against Congressional Supermajority Voting Rules, 106
NW. U. L. REV. 1091, 1145 (2012).
19
See BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 17, at 9 (discussing the small states’ fear of, and the large
states’ preference for, proportional representation).
20
See Coenen, supra note 18, at 1146 (noting Madison’s adamancy towards proportional
representation).
21
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
22
A Great Compromise, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/
A_Great_Compromise.htm [http://perma.cc/Z9MM-FFQ3].
13

600

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:595

While the Great Compromise provided for proportional representation
in the House of Representatives, it did not explain precisely how to
apportion seats. The only requirements were that congressional districts
must consist of at least thirty thousand people, and that each state must
have at least one representative.23 It was expected that “[t]he House of
Representatives would indeed grow as the nation enlarged,”24 but what
exactly that might entail as far as apportionment remained unclear at the
time.
While today the House is set at 435 seats, the Framers, rather,
“approached the question . . . as a ratio of representation.”25 Thomas
Jefferson worried that a House too small might risk “domination by special
interests[,]” and critics noted that a small House “would result in
Representatives lacking ‘a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of
their large constituencies.’”26 James Madison, on the other hand, asserted
that “the number ought at most to be kept within a certain limit, in order to
avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude.”27 However,
Madison also argued that since the passage of every ten years required a
new census, the House would grow to four hundred members within fifty
years, thereby rendering moot any concerns of a small House.28 However,
he also spoke when there were only thirteen states and fewer than four
million people.29
B. The Original First Amendment
The first Congress met in 1789 to propose twelve amendments to the
Constitution.30 Of these twelve, the third through the twelfth were ratified,
but not the first or second.31The originally proposed first amendment
remains the only one of the twelve to never have been ratified. It reads:
After the first enumeration required by the first article of the
Constitution, there shall be one Representative for every
23

See supra notes 12–15.
1 FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS: THE DEBATE OVER THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 31, 38 (John P. Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds., 2d ed. 1998).
25
Anthony J. Gaughan, To End Gerrymandering: The Canadian Model for Reforming the
Congressional Redistricting Process in the United States, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 999, 1005 (2013).
26
Id. at 1006.
27
THE FEDERALIST No. 55 (James Madison).
28
Id.
29
1790 Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through
_the_decades/fast_facts/1790_fast_facts.html [https://perma.cc/M2DW-ZPNY] (last visited Sept. 28,
2015).
30
The Bill of Rights, CHARTERS OF FREEDOM, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of
_rights_transcript.html [http://perma.cc/FUK4-L8Q4] (last visited Apr. 26, 2015).
31
Id. The original second amendment stated: “No law, varying the compensation for the services
of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have
intervened[]” and was ratified in 1992 as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment. Id.
24
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thirty thousand, until the number shall amount to one
hundred, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by
Congress, that there shall be not less than one hundred
Representatives, nor less than one Representative for every
forty thousand persons, until the number of Representatives
shall amount to two hundred; after which the proportion shall
be so regulated by Congress, that there shall not be less than
two hundred Representatives, nor more than one
Representative for every fifty thousand persons.32
Though never ratified, this original first amendment was defeated in
1789 by merely one vote.33 While the amendment would not affect the size
of the House today, this proposed amendment shows that the Framers were
deeply concerned with creating a fair and accurate ratio of persons to
representatives.
C. Ratios of Representation
With the first inaugural census in 1790 came disagreements over what
to do with fractions of seats.34 Should the math determine that a state
receive six votes, apportioning six votes would be easy enough. But how
should numbers coming out to 5.25, 5.5, and 5.75, be evaluated? Should
they be rounded up or down? Or should another method be adopted?
Congress adopted Hamilton’s method,35 and subsequently other methods
were used.36
While the size of the House steadily grew from 1790 to 1910, the
Apportionment Act of 1911 established a cap at 435 representatives.37
Thus, the House grew over 120 years based on population, but in the last
105 years, it has remained static. The 1790 census revealed a population of
a little over 3.9 million.38 In 1910, the population had grown to just over 92
million.39 By 2010, the population was over 308 million.40 Figure 1, below,
32

Id.
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1138 (1991).
34
See Gaughan, supra note 25, at 1007–08 (discussing disagreements over whether fractions of
seats should be rounded up, rounded down, or treated otherwise).
35
For a discussion of Hamilton’s method, see Methods of Apportionment, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/history/www/reference/apportionment/methods_of_apportionment.html [https:
//perma.cc/QU4T-N5A9] (last visited Apr. 26, 2015).
36
For a discussion of all the methods the United States has used, see supra note 35.
37
Apportionment Act of 1911, ch. 5, § 1, 37 Stat 13, 13–14; see also Gaughan, supra note 25, at
1010 (discussing the steady growth of the House of Representatives until the Apportionment Act of
1911).
38
1790 Fast Facts, supra note 29.
39
1910 Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the
_decades/fast_facts/1910_fast_facts.html [https://perma.cc/LMG3-LEA9] (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
40
Resident Population Data, U.S. CENSUS 2010, http://www.census.gov/2010census/data/
apportionment-pop-text.php [http://perma.cc/2RHS-TU9T] (last visited Apr. 26, 2015).
33
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This figure illustrates that, in 1790, one member of the House
represented roughly 60,000 people; in 1910, one member represented
roughly 212,000; and in 2010, one member represented roughly 710,000
people. In other words, a representative in 2010 was responsible for
representing nearly twelve times more constituents than if he had been a
representative in 1790. The U.S. Census Bureau projects a rise in
population by 2020 to 341.4 million.41 If the House stays at 435 seats, that
will leave one representative for about every 784,828 people, or thirteen
times as many constituents per representative as in 1790. Recall that some
critics, including Thomas Jefferson, believed the size of the House in 1790
to be too small to adequately represent the People. Given that James
Madison expected the House to consist of four hundred members by 1840,
it is difficult to imagine that even he would have approved of our current
ratio.
A major catalyst for the American Revolution was the colonists’ lack
of representation in British Parliament.42 American colonists were
“virtually represented” in the House of Commons.43 Under this virtual
41
Mitra Toossi, Labor Force Projections to 2020: A More Slowly Growing Workforce, 135
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 43, 45 (2012).
42
See American Revolution History, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/americanrevolution/american-revolution-history [http://perma.cc/MA6F-3YHM] (last visited May 13, 2015).
43
Proportional Representation, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/
Institution/Origins-Development/Proportional-Representation/ [http://perma.cc/V3SS-Q6RU] (last
visited May 13, 2015).
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representation, members of Parliament were considered to represent
everyone, even though there were no representatives in Parliament who
were residents of the colonies.44 Another—albeit less catchy—way of
putting the familiar cry of “No taxation without representation” is that it
comes from the colonists’ frustration that the British Parliament kept
raising taxes on them without apportioning the colonists any actual
representation in Parliament.45 Thus, apportionment “was viewed as one of
the most fundamental issues to be decided at the Convention.”46
Other industrialized nations have addressed apportionment in various
ways. Like the United States, Canada performs a decennial census
followed by reapportionment in order to facilitate proportional
representation.47 Since 1867, the number of representatives in the Canadian
House of Commons has increased from 181 to 308.48 The United Kingdom
is divided into 650 constituencies.49 Each constituency elects one
representative to the House of Commons.50 The median constituency size
across the United Kingdom varies from 56,800 in Wales to 72,400 in
England.51
Japan has enabled even more malapportionment than the United States.
For example, in 2012, the ratio of disparity between the smallest and
largest districts was 1:2.38.52 However, the Japanese Supreme Court ruled
that a ratio of disparity of 1:2 or greater was unconstitutional.53 While
Japan is known for its malapportionment, it differs from the United States
in that Japanese malapportionment “does not significantly affect election
outcomes.”54 And despite such disparity, Japan’s apportionment method

44
45

Id.
American Revolution History, supra note 42 (discussing events leading up to the Revolutionary

War).
46

BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 17, at 6.
The House of Commons and Its Members, PARLIAMENT OF CANADA, http://www.parl.gc.ca/
marleaumontpetit/DocumentViewer.aspx?Sec=Ch04&Seq=2&Language=E
[http://perma.cc/FDN2SHMF] (last visited May 13, 2015).
48
HOUSE OF COMMONS PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE (Audrey O’Brien & Marc Bosc eds., 2d ed.
2009), http://www.parl.gc.ca/procedure-book-livre/document.aspx?sbdid=2ae20cbe-e824-466b-b37c8941bbc99c37&sbpidx=2 [http://perma.cc/4P5R-7D6L]; House of Commons Seat Allocation by
Province, ELECTIONS CANADA, http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=cir/red/allo&
document=index&lang=e [http://perma.cc/72WM-ET7V] (last modified Mar. 23, 2012).
49
How MPs Are Elected, PARLIAMENT.UK, http://www.parliament.uk/about/mps-and-lords/
members/electing-mps/ [http://perma.cc/27B7-ZP9D] (last visited May 13, 2015).
50
Id.
51
Parliament Constituencies, PARLIAMENT.UK, http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/electionsand-voting/constituencies/ [http://perma.cc/R6CW-QUS9] (last visited May 13, 2015).
52
Ray Christensen, Malapportionment and the 2012 House of Representatives Election, in
ROBERT PEKKANEN, STEVEN REED & ETHAN SCHEINER, JAPAN DECIDES 2012: THE JAPANESE
GENERAL ELECTION 139 (2013).
53
Id.
54
Id. at 140.
47
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avoids “contorted or gerrymandered election districts.” Japan, with a
population of 127.9 million, has 475 representatives in its lower chamber
(or one representative for every 269,263 people).56
India attempts to maintain as close to an equal ratio of representation
in its Lok Sabha (“House of the People”) between states as possible.57 Yet,
with a population of 1,236,344,631 (about four times that of the United
States), India has only 552 representatives in the Lok Sabha.58 Different
from most Western countries, China has a unicameral Congress known as
the National People’s Congress (NPC).59 According to the NPC,
apportionment of delegates is based on “the proportion of the population”
with a minimum of fifteen delegates to each province.60 “At the same time,
the allocation should make sure that there is appropriate representation of
all ethnic groups, people from all walks of life and all political parties
within the NPC.”61 There are nearly 3,000 delegates to the NPC, but some
commentators doubt whether the delegates really represent the people.62
Each industrialized nation has addressed apportionment of
representatives in its own way, having each faced challenges unique to
their histories. Yet, as a matter of empirics, most lower house chambers in
the world are about the size of the cube root of the population.63 This
phenomenon is known as the Cube Root Law of National Assembly Size
(“Cube Root Law”).64 See Figure 2 for an illustration of where other
countries and the U.S. fall in relation to the cubed root of their populations.

55

Id.
Countries of the World, WORLD ATLAS, http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/populations/cty
popls.htm [http://perma.cc/F6TC-WL7N] (last modified Aug. 11, 2015); Strength of the In-House
Groups in the House of Representatives, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.shugiin.go.jp/
internet/itdb_english.nsf/html/statics/english/strength.htm
[http://perma.cc/9KYT-WEVT]
(last
modified Aug. 20, 2015).
57
LOK SABHA HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE, http://loksabha.nic.in/ [http://perma.cc/4BYV-R82S] (last
visited May 12, 2015).
58
Id.; Country Comparison: Population, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html [https://perma.cc/PGT2-7V9S] (last visited
Aug. 22, 2015).
59
National People’s Congress, NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONGRESS PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Organization/node_2846.htm [http://perma.cc/WB66-DL4N] (last
visited May 12, 2015).
60
NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONGRESS, http://www.china.org.cn/english/archiveen/27743.htm [http://per
ma.cc/M2NJ-4TVW] (last visited May 12, 2015).
61
Id.
62
See, e.g., How China Is Ruled: National People’s Congress, BBC NEWS (Oct. 8, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13908155 [http://perma.cc/9N3B-CRY7] (discussing the
National People’s Congress’s lack of independence).
63
Ryan Teague Beckwith, Is Congress Too Small? Some Think So, DENVER POST (Feb. 20, 2013,
7:46 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/politics-national/2013/02/is-congress-too-small-some-think-so/
[http://perma.cc/K4JL-VMB7].
64
Id.
56
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Figure 265
In Figure 2, the x-axis represents the country’s population and the yaxis represents the size of the lower house chamber. Note that the dotted
line represents the cube root of the population, and that most nations fall
somewhere along or near that line. The U.S. is an outlier with a House size
of only about sixty-five percent of its population’s cube root. The United
Kingdom and Italy are also outliers; however, they each have much larger
chambers for their population sizes, meaning there are more
representatives per person in the United Kingdom and Italy than in most
other nations. In other words, the people in these nations are more fully
represented than Americans.
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed that apportionment should be
proportional.66 However, its navigation of intra- and interstate
malapportionment has not been entirely consistent.

65
To see the size of each country’s population and lower chamber, see The World Factbook,
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ [http://per
ma.cc/9P9U-CHXN] (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
66
Wesberry v. Sanders, 36 U.S. 1, 17 (1964), discussed in greater detail infra.
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D. Supreme Court Rulings
The Supreme Court has avoided officially ruling on the
constitutionality of interstate malapportionment. However, it has ruled that
intrastate malapportionment is unconstitutional.67 Let us first look at two
cases in which the Court at least addressed interstate malapportionment.
When Montana challenged apportionment based on a disparity
between its own district size and those of Washington, the Court found
that, in matters of interstate apportionment, Congress is entitled to
expansive deference.68 The Court acknowledged that “common sense
supports a test requiring a good-faith effort to achieve precise
mathematical equality,”69 but found that “the constraints imposed by
Article I, § 2, itself make that goal illusory for the Nation as a whole.”70
Yet, in U.S. Department of Commerce v. Montana, ruling in favor of
Montana would have resulted in “increasing the variance in the relative
difference between the ideal and the size of the districts in both Montana
and Washington.”71 This, the Court found problematic.
Four years later, the Court evaluated whether changes to the method of
conducting the census might be required, and addressed the matter of
interstate apportionment.72 Though the Court of Appeals applied the
Wesberry v. Sanders standard of “one person-one vote,” the Supreme
Court found that the appellate court “undervalued the significance of the
fact that the Constitution makes it impossible to achieve population
equality among interstate districts.”73 Though this may sound damning to
proponents of interstate apportionment reform, the impossibility of
achieving exact population equality should not be a deterrent to improving
on our current system for two reasons: (1) Wesberry has set the stage for
greater equality in interstate apportionment, and (2) the legislature could
also make several changes to increase equality without amending the
Constitution.
Despite having given little direction for remedying interstate
malapportionment, the Court has specifically addressed intrastate
malapportionment. Writing for the majority in Wesberry, Justice Black
stated: “No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a
voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good
67

Id.
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 464 (1992) (“[A]pportionment of
Representatives among the several States ‘according to their respective Numbers’ commands far more
deference than a state districting decision that is capable of being reviewed under a relatively rigid
mathematical standard.”).
69
Id. at 463 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 462.
72
Wisconsin v. New York, 517 U.S. 1, 14, 17 (1996).
73
Id. at 17.
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citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the
right to vote is undermined.”74 In Wesberry, citizens and qualified voters of
one Georgia county challenged the apportionment among Georgia districts
due to vast discrepancies in their populations.75 The Court held “that
Representatives be chosen by the People of the several States means that as
nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be
worth as much as another’s.”76
Justice Black went on to write:
We do not believe that the Framers of the Constitution
intended to permit the same vote-diluting discrimination to
be accomplished through the device of districts containing
widely varied numbers of inhabitants. To say that a vote is
worth more in one district than in another would . . . run
counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic
government . . . .77
While the Court referred only to intrastate apportionment, at least some
argue that the standard should or could be applied to interstate
apportionment. Professor Jeffrey Ladewig, a well-known political science
scholar, asserts: “There is nothing . . . within these cases that explicitly
limits this constitutional requirement to state variations. The constitutional
requirement is not ‘one person in one state, one vote in one state.’”78
In fact, the Court in Wisconsin cited Wesberry in stating,
“[C]onstitutional requirements make it impossible to achieve precise
equality in voting power nationwide.”79 However, “the impossibility of
achieving precise mathematical equality is no excuse for [the Federal
Government] not making [the] mandated good-faith effort.”80
Though the Court remains reluctant to formally rule on interstate
apportionment, leaving the issue to Congress, it has at least moved in the
direction of “one person, one vote” by stating such with regard to intrastate
districts.
E. Justiciability
Another dimension to these cases (in addition to equal representation)
was justiciability, with the Court articulating new ideas about the Political
74

Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
Id. at 2.
76
Id. at 7–8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77
Id. at 8.
78
Jeffrey W. Ladewig, One Person, One Vote, 435 Seats: Interstate Malapportionment and
Constitutional Requirements, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1140 (2011).
79
Wisconsin v. New York, 517 U.S. 1, 16 (1996).
80
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Question Doctrine.
Under Article III of the Constitution, “the judicial Power shall extend
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority.”81 In Marbury v. Madison, the Court held, “questions in
their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted
to the executive, can never be made in this court.”82 This formed the
“Political Question Doctrine.”
Current case law would support an interstate apportionment claim as
justiciable, and not a matter of political question. In Baker v. Carr, the
Court evaluated the justiciability of an intrastate malapportionment claim.83
Baker argued, under the Fourteenth Amendment, that the Tennessee
legislature’s failure to redistrict since 1901, following its 1900 census,
deprived him of equal protection.84 The Court found that dismissing his
complaint due to the political question doctrine would “be justified only if
that claim were so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid
of merit, or frivolous.”85 The Court noted that “the mere fact that the suit
seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a political
question.”86 It went on to hold, “Appellants’ claim that they are being
denied equal protection is justiciable, and if discrimination is sufficiently
shown, the right to relief under the equal protection clause is not
diminished by the fact that the discrimination relates to political rights.”87
So, from Baker we learned not only that apportionment claims can be
justiciable, but that they can be evaluated under the Equal Protection
Clause.
Two years later, in Wesberry, the Court once again visited the issue of
political questions.88 In Wesberry, citizens of Georgia claimed population
disparities between districts within the state “deprived them and voters
similarly situated of a right under the Federal Constitution to have their
votes for Congressmen given the same weight as the votes of other
Georgians.”89 In upholding its ruling in Baker, the Wesberry Court found,
“[t]he right to vote is too important in our free society to be stripped.”90
The issue of political questions arose in an interstate apportionment
81

U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803).
83
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
84
Id. at 199.
85
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
86
Id. at 209.
87
Id. at 209–10 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). This case overturned
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946), in which the Court held that challenges to
apportionment of congressional districts raised only nonjusticiable political questions.
88
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1964).
89
Id. at 3.
90
Id. at 7.
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case as well. In U.S. Department of Commerce v. Montana, the Court
found that the issue was “political in the same sense that Baker v. Carr was
a political case.”92 The Court went on to hold that “the interpretation of the
apportionment provisions of the Constitution is well within the competence
of the Judiciary.”93
The Court has rightly left cases of apportionment open to the judiciary.
The Baker Court found justiciability in malapportionment which resulted
in discrimination. The plaintiffs had faced individual harms which could be
remedied. Further, the Court found that they were protected under the
Equal Protection Clause. Shutting down the judiciary to issues of
apportionment would result in voters being subjected to discrimination
without an avenue for relief. Professors Williams and MacDonald describe
the holdings of Baker and Wesberry as decisions that “empower the
citizenry to achieve boundless progress in the future by being able to vote
effectively.”94
Consistency demands that the courts take up the issue of interstate
apportionment, and do so with the aim (or at least motivating desire) of
equalizing district population. The Constitution uses the phrase “among the
several states,”95 not “within” the several states. While the Court has left
the matter of interstate apportionment to the discretion of Congress, the
Court should rule on its constitutionality, based on the holdings in previous
cases. In Wesberry, the Court relied on this wording when it applied a “one
person, one vote” standard,96 leaving no reason to assume this should only
apply to apportionment within states. On the contrary, more equality in
interstate apportionment may rise to an even higher level of importance,
since interstate apportionment affects who will become president.
In Wesberry, the Court stated:
A single Congressman represents from two to three times as
many Fifth District voters as are represented by each of the
Congressmen from the other Georgia congressional districts.
The apportionment statute thus contracts the value of some
votes and expands that of others. If the Federal Constitution
intends that when qualified voters elect members of Congress
each vote be given as much weight as any other vote, then

91

U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992).
Id. at 458 (internal quotation marks omitted).
93
Id.
94
Victor Williams & Alison M. MacDonald, Rethinking Article II, Section 1 and its Twelfth
Amendment Restatement: Challenging Our Nation’s Malapportioned, Undemocratic Presidential
Election Systems, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 201, 245 (1994).
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U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
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Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
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this statute cannot stand.

There is no reason this standard should not be applied to interstate
apportionment. In Wesberry’s most egregious instance, there was a
difference of over 550,000 individuals between Georgia districts.98 If such
a difference contracts the votes of some, then large differences in interstate
district sizes must contract the votes of many.
Citing to Wesberry, the Court in Reynolds v. Sims struck down
malapportionment of the Alabama state legislature under the Equal
Protection Clause.99 Chief Justice Warren wrote:
Since the achieving of fair and effective representation for all
citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative
apportionment, we conclude that the Equal Protection Clause
guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by all
voters in the election of state legislators. Diluting the weight
of votes because of place of residence impairs basic
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just as
much as invidious discriminations based upon factors such as
race, or economic status.100
While the Reynolds Court ruled only on apportionment as related to
electing state legislators,101 the same logic can easily be applied to national
elections. Fair and effective representation, as well as avoiding vote
dilution, were clearly the Framers’ goals as they relate to federal elections
as much as state elections.102
Though a pure “one person one vote” standard may not be feasible in
regard to interstate apportionment because not more than one
representative can be apportioned per thirty thousand people, the inability
for perfection does not reduce the necessity for striving for as close to
equal district sizes as possible. A deviation of ten percent or less is
accepted for districts voting for state legislatures.103 The Supreme Court
has not presented justification for not applying a similar standard to
interstate apportionment.104 The Court need not establish a ten percent limit
97

Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2.
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Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 584 (1964).
100
Id. at 565–66 (citations omitted).
101
Id. at 566.
102
See supra Part II.A–C.
103
MARK JONATHAN MCKENZIE, BEYOND PARTISANSHIP? FEDERAL COURTS, STATE
COMMISSIONS, AND REDISTRICTING 32–33 (2007) (discussing how the Court seems to have determined
a ten percent (or smaller) deviation is generally accepted).
104
The Court only said Congress should handle this issue and it would be impossible for
exactness in interstate apportionment. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 464
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on interstate malapportionment, but it should find a reasonable range that
could be sustainable under the other proposed changes. Because some
small states have only one district, which could throw off percentages, the
Court should look at how far a state’s district sizes deviate from the
average district size in determining the constitutionality of apportionment.
Based on my proposals as applied to the 2000 census, the average
district’s deviation from the average district size would be about seven
percent.105 While our current system allows for a difference between the
district sizes in Rhode Island and Montana of 466,792, had my method
been applied in 2000, the largest disparity between district sizes would
have been 264,778 (between North Dakota’s single district and South
Dakota’s two districts). Fourteen states would have deviations from the
average of less than ten thousand people. Thirty-five states would deviate
by less than twenty-five thousand people; and only four states (including
the District of Columbia and the single-district states of Vermont, North
Dakota, and Alaska) would deviate by more than one hundred thousand
people. If those three single district states and Washington D.C. are taken
out of the equation, the average district size disparity is just over 21,254, or
4.7% away from average. The average district size would also be cut down
to 477,619 people.
An interstate malapportionment challenge should not face opposition
as it relates to the Political Question Doctrine. Though the Court has
historically left the issue to Congress, Congress has failed to act. Because
the Court was vehement in finding intrastate malapportionment unjust, it
should rule the same way with regard to interstate malapportionment.
Rather than look at disparities between states, the Court might find it easier
in determining a cut off for deviations from the average district size of all
states. Once the Court has made such a ruling, Congress will have to act to
change how to apportion representatives.
III. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE CURRENT SYSTEM
With such broadly constructed Constitutional requirements,106
disagreement over apportionment in the twenty-first century is an
inevitability. Three of the four requirements instruct only on a minimum
and maximum number of representatives as well as restrict House districts
from crossing state lines. The fourth requirement—that “[r]epresentatives
shall be apportioned among the several states according to their
numbers”107—could lead to several different understandings. Pertinent
process must also delegate to Congress a measure of discretion that is broader than that accorded to the
States in the much easier task of determining district sizes within state borders.”).
105
See infra Part VI.
106
Supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text.
107
U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
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questions remain unanswered: Is it really acceptable to cap the House at
435 representatives? For how long? How equal must interstate district sizes
be? The Constitution makes no mention of interstate or intrastate
apportionment, yet the Court has read into it a “one person one vote”
standard.108 Currently, House representatives are technically apportioned
among the states based on their respective numbers, though the differences
between district sizes threatens the constitutionality of that
apportionment—as the gaps in district sizes between states grow, the
ability to claim that representatives are apportioned according to their
numbers weakens. The lack of guidelines allows for a wide range of
interpretation by both the Legislature and the Court. This lack of guidance
also led to the passing of the Apportionment Act of 1911 and its centuryplus-long hold on the size of the House.
As interstate apportionment proportionality decreases as a result of the
minimal constitutional requirements, so does the accuracy in how we
choose the president.109 Thomas Jefferson said: “No invasions of the
Constitution are fundamentally so dangerous as the tricks played [by
members of Congress] on their own numbers, apportionment, and other
circumstances respecting themselves.”110 Leaving the cap on
representatives at 435 inevitably results in (1) states with an unacceptably
high, and not to mention growing, number of under-represented
individuals; and (2) states with over-represented individuals.111 This
mixture of states where individuals are over- and under-represented defies
the “one person one vote” standard set out by the Court in Wesberry.
Professor Ladewig points out, “after the 2000 reapportionment, one
example of interstate malapportionment was more than 21 times greater
than
the
intrastate
malapportionment
[previously]
ruled
unconstitutional.”112
To John Adams, fairness in elections was essential. In his essay,
Thoughts on Government, he wrote:
The principal difficulty lies, and the greatest care should be
108
See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1964) (discussing the Founders’ intention
regarding Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution).
109
This is due to widening gaps between the power residents of under- and over-represented
states have in Washington D.C. and in the Electoral College.
110
Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Bill Apportioning Representation (Apr. 4, 1792), in 5 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 500 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895).
111
See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Ladewig & Matthew P. Jasinski, On the Causes and Consequences of and
Remedies for Interstate Malapportionment of the U.S. House of Representatives, 6 PERSP. ON POL. 89,
93 (2008) (giving examples of states in which citizens are under- and over-represented). In fact, “The
average discrepancy of the ten states with the smallest apportionment discrepancy was 3,796
individuals; of the ten states with greatest apportionment discrepancy, 112,561 individuals: a difference
of nearly 30 times.” Id.
112
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employed, in constituting this representative assembly. It
should be in miniature an exact portrait of the people at large.
It should think, feel, reason, and act like them. That it may be
the interest of this assembly to do strict justice at all times, it
should be an equal representation, or, in other words, equal
interests among the people should have equal interests in it.
Great care should be taken to effect this, and to prevent
unfair, partial, and corrupt elections.113
At the Constitutional Convention debates (“Debates”), James Wilson
said: “The Legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole
Society. Representation is made necessary only because it is impossible for
the people to act collectively.”114 While James Madison championed
fairness and proportionality in representation in The Federalist,115 Brutus
did the same in The Anti-Federalist: “It is a matter of the highest
importance, in forming this representation, that it be so constituted as to be
capable of understanding the true interests of the society . . . . There is no
possible way to effect this but by an equal, full and fair representation.”116
During the Debates, James Madison said: “If the power is not immediately
derived from the people in proportion to their numbers, we may make a
paper confederacy, but that will be all.”117
Given that the Framers intended proportional representation, and given
the text of the Constitution,118 the fact that the legislature curbed the
growth of the House of Representatives, as well as the ability for
individuals to be proportionally represented, may not be entirely
constitutional. When looking at the actual statistics, the issue becomes
even more problematic. For example, the 2000 reapportionment resulted in
each person’s vote from Montana being worth less than three-fifths of a
person’s from Wyoming.119 Smaller states, in general, will face greater
levels of malapportionment than larger states (whether that be by under- or
over-representation).120
As it currently stands, even medium-sized states are not proportionally
represented. For example, based on the 2010 apportionment, North
Carolina’s districts run about 23,000 people greater than the average,
whereas South Carolina’s districts run about 49,000 people less than the
113
John Adams, Thoughts on Government 4:86–93, UNIV. CHICAGO, http://press-pubs.uchica
go.edu/founders/documents/v1ch4s5.html [http://perma.cc/78VM-5JMM] (last visited Aug. 22, 2015).
114
Frederick Upham Adams, The New Democracy, 3 NEW TIME 29, 32 (1898).
115
Supra note 27 and accompanying text.
116
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 382–83 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
117
Rule of Representation in the First Branch of the Legislature [29 June] 1787, supra note 1.
118
The Fourteenth Amendment states, “Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers.” U.S. CONST. amend XIV (emphasis added).
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Ladewig, supra note 78, at 1131.
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average district, for a total disparity between the Carolinas of 72,000
people per district.121 A vote in Oregon is worth about eighty-six percent of
a vote in Minnesota.122 Districts in Louisiana comprise about 46,000 more
people than the average, and in Washington about 37,600 less, for a total
disparity between the states of about 83,600 per district.123 And, of course,
the disparities between small states are even more egregious. Districts in
Iowa are made up of nearly 153,000 more individuals than districts in
Nebraska.124 Delaware’s single district boasts 900,877 people, 187,902
above average, while Vermont’s single district comprises 630,337, 82,600
below average.125 The greatest disparity lies between Wyoming’s single
district of 568,300 people and Montana’s single district of 994,416 people
(a 426,116 difference).126 While the large states experience the least
malapportionment, even the difference in district sizes between Florida and
Ohio is about 23,000, and those states are made up of many more districts
than the small states.127 So, each of Ohio’s sixteen districts are made up of
23,000 fewer individuals than each of Florida’s twenty-seven districts.
While an exact “one person one vote” standard with regard to interstate
apportionment may, indeed, be unattainable, deliberately stopping the
growth of the House, and therefore lessening the proportionality of
representation, only serves to undercut that standard.
And let us not forget the reason the House of Representatives exists: so
that the people can be represented in government.128 During the Debates,
George Mason said, “Representatives should sympathize with their
constituents; [they] should think as they think, and feel as they feel.”129 As
discussed previously, as district sizes increase, the ability for
Representatives to know and adequately represent their constituents
decreases.130 Further, with such a small group of representatives, special
interest groups can buy the support of enough Representatives to pass bills
121

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 2, at 2. Note that the average district size is about 710,000.
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131

they support. One journalist argues that “[t]he House of Representatives
has become another U.S. Senate where a rarefied few supposedly
represents the needs of the many.”132 He asserts that the relatively small
size of the House is “the main reason that hyper-partisanship and special
interests seem to control the legislative agenda.”133
Lack of proportionality also results in greater competition in states
where district sizes are larger than the average.134 For example,
constituents from Montana have to compete nearly twice as hard for their
representative’s ear than constituents from Wyoming. Worse still, Montana
and Wyoming border each other, so a person living next to the border on
the Wyoming side will have more power in Washington than someone
living just across the border on the Montana side. In 1977, Richard Fenno
Jr. wrote about the problematic relationship between representatives and
constituents.135 The 1970 census revealed a population of 203,302,031.136
By 2010, the United States had more than 105 million more people than in
1970, when such constituency problems were studied.137 Yet, despite a
fifty percent increase in the U.S. population, the House has remained
stagnant at 435 representatives.138 The average representative in 1970
needed to understand constituencies of about 467,361 people.139 The
average representative in 2010 represented 709,760 people.140 Recall that
the average representative in the early twentieth century was expected to
speak for just over 200,000 individuals, more than three times fewer than
today.141
Another problem with the current system is that apportionment is
governed by a complicated mathematical formula, the Huntington-Hill
131
Brian Flynn, What’s Wrong with Congress? It’s Not Big Enough, CNN (Mar. 3, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/09/opinion/flynn-expand-congress/ [http://perma.cc/NWT5-2J46].
132
Id.
133
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See Mary A. Inman, Comment, C.P.R. (Change Through Proportional Representation):
Resuscitating a Federal Election System, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1991, 2024 n.162 (1993) (noting that
constituents of a state with district sizes of 700,000 will have to compete seven times as hard for
representation as a state with district sizes of 100,000).
135
Richard F. Fenno Jr., U.S. House Members and Their Constituencies: An Exploration, 71 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 883, 887, 893, 894, 898, 900 (1977) (discussing various disconnects between
representatives and their constituents, such as differentiating between who might and who might not
vote for the representative, the amount of time representatives have to spend in their home districts, and
viewing constituencies as homogenous).
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Population, Housing Units, Area Measurements, and Density: 1790 to 1990, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/files/table-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/CSE5J225] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015).
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Method (“Hill Method”) that is not intuitive and that can lead to bias. The
Hill Method requires first dividing the population by the number of
representatives.142 Using 2010 data, the solution to this equation is
709,759.8575. The population of each state is then divided by this
number.143 Each state is assigned an “upper quotient” and “lower quotient.”
Next, one must determine each state’s geometric mean.144 This is done by
first multiplying the upper and lower quotient by each other, and then
taking the square root of the product.145 If the geometric mean is less than
the quotient, the state gets an additional representative, but if the geometric
mean is greater than the quotient, the state rounds down. Consider the
following table featuring four states as examples:
State

Population

Quotient

Calif.
Ga.
Iowa
Mont.

37,253,956
9,687,653
3,046,355
989,415

52.488
13.65
4.29
1.39

Lower
Quot.
52
13
4
1

Upper
Quot.
53
14
5
2

Geom.
Mean
52.498
13.49
4.47
1.73

Seats
App’d
52
14
4
1

Table 1
But what if, after determining how many seats each state should be
apportioned, the total number does not come out to 435? In that case, one
must find a modified divisor by trial and error until the correct number of
seats is found.146
While we currently use the Hill Method, this has not always been the
case. Changes in the use of apportionment methods have largely been
politically motivated. Complaints that one method affected northern states
differently than southern states were succeeded by complaints that another
method affected large states differently than small states.147 Using an
apportionment method that lacks bias is the apolitical and fair solution.
Keeping the House from gaining more than 435 seats may have even
more consequences than poor representation. Professor Gaughan et al.
142
Methods of Apportionment, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/
reference/apportionment/methods_of_apportionment.html [http://perma.cc/DG9R-MZ6F] (last visited
Aug. 19, 2015).
143
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144
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145
Id.
146
Apportionment Methods, U. ALA., http://www.ctl.ua.edu/math103/apportionment/appmeth.htm
[http://perma.cc/UGL7-U569] (last visited Aug. 19, 2015).
147
BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 17, at 35 (“The United States congressional debates of 1792
through 1832 were largely fired by sectional and political self-interest in the face of growth and of
relative shifts in population.”).
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claim that the 435-seat cap allows “federal apportionment law [to] aid[]
and abet[] partisan gerrymandering.”148 For example, in the 2010 election,
more people voted for Democratic candidates than Republicans, yet
Republicans won the House due to gerrymandering.149
Our current method of apportionment fails to proportionally represent
the people, as it was intended to do, resulting in a lack of fairness and
accuracy. Representatives are expected to understand the needs of twelve
times as many constituents as when the country was founded.150 Other
consequences, like partisan gerrymandering, infect the integrity of the
system. A solution would return to the Framers’ vision by increasing
accuracy and fairness through proportionality.
IV. MODERNIZING APPORTIONMENT TO REFLECT THE FRAMERS’ GOALS
In this Part, I discuss the two main steps Congress should take in order
to improve interstate apportionment. In Part V, I discuss further solutions
that build upon these two core solutions.
A. Two Steps to Greater Proportionality
First, the Cube Root Law should govern the number of representatives
in the House. Recall that under the Cube Root Law, the number of
representatives should be approximately equal to the cubed root of the total
population.151 This equation expedites efficiency while not overwhelming
the House with a directly proportional number of representatives.152 In
2010, the total U.S. population was 308,745,538.153 The rounded cubed
root of this population is 676.154
Implementing the Cube Root Law requires only repealing Section 1 of
the Apportionment Act of 1911155 and passing a new, up to date,
apportionment act. A constitutional amendment would also work, but a
statute is preferable for procedural reasons because a statute is easier and
148
Gaughan, supra note 25, at 1025; see also H. Peyton Young, Dividing the House: Why
Congress Should Reinstate an Old Reapportionment Formula, BROOKINGS POL’Y BRIEF SERIES (Aug.
2001), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2001/08/politics-young [http://perma.cc/65YA-R6
MN] (arguing that politics play a part in choosing apportionment methods).
149
See Dana Milbank, Republicans’ Stacked Deck in the House, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2013, at
A15 (asserting that, due to redistricting, the “Republican House majority is impervious to the will of
the electorate”).
150
Supra Part II.C.
151
BRIAN FREDERICK, CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATION & CONSTITUENTS: THE CASE FOR
INCREASING THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 15 (2010).
152
Id. at 15–16. For a longer discussion of the Cube Root Law, see FREDERICK, supra note 151.
Notably, if the House was assigned one seat per 30,000 people, there would be 10,291 representatives.
153
Resident Population Data, supra note 40.
154
Taking the cubed root of 308,745,538 results in 675.875799983, which would be rounded up
to 676.
155
Apportionment Act of 1911, ch. 5, § 1, 37 Stat 13, 13–14.
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more likely to pass. Moreover, should future legislators find reason to
change the method of apportionment to suit their modern needs, they
would find it easier to repeal such a statute and create their own
apportionment act than to pass and ratify a new constitutional amendment.
My second proposal is to replace the Hill Method with the simpler,
fairer, and more intuitive Webster Method. The Webster Method requires
first determining a standard divisor by dividing the U.S. population by the
number of representatives.156 Then, each state’s population is divided by
the standard divisor.157 The solutions are simply rounded up or down.158 In
the following table, I show the results of applying the Cube Root Law and
the Webster Method to the 2000 House of Representatives. Using the Cube
Root Law would result in a House of approximately 655 representatives.159
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
156

Pop/Div
10.35551
1.45987
11.94718
6.22527
78.87349
10.01591
7.93019
1.83114
37.21650
19.06296
2.82118
3.01310
28.91955
14.15901
6.81423
6.26053
9.41165
10.40645
2.96878
12.33339
14.78450
23.14265
11.45549

State
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia

Pop/Div
2.10085
3.98484
4.65313
2.87765
19.59364
4.23582
44.18856
18.74362
1.49542
26.43691
8.03518
7.96706
28.59765
2.44111
9.34236
1.75772
13.24805
48.55553
5.20015
1.41771
16.48302
13.72504
4.21090

Methods of Apportionment, supra note 35.
Id.
158
Id.
159
Resident Population Data, supra note 40. The cubed root of the 2000 population, 281,421,906,
is 655.318809119, which can be rounded down to 655.
157
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Mississippi
Missouri

6.62406
13.02900

Wisconsin
Wyoming
DC
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12.48984
1.14982
1.33209

Table 2160
After rounding up and down, the final representative count for each
state would be as follows:
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

Reps.
10
1
12
6
79
10
8
2
37
19
3
3
29
14
7
6
9
10
3
12
15
23
11
7
13

State
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Reps.
2
4
5
3
20
4
44
19
1
26
8
8
29
2
9
2
13
49
5
1
16
14
4
12
1

160
Though the District of Columbia has a delegate in the House of Representatives, it does not get
a vote in the House, nor does it have any senators because it is not a state. Directory of Representatives,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.gov/representatives/ [http://perma.cc/ZU2HGGBJ] (last visited May 8, 2015); DC.GOV, http://dc.gov/page/statehood [http://perma.cc/9B48RBNG] (last visited May 8, 2015). However, under the Twenty-Third Amendment, D.C. is given at
least three Electoral College votes, and no more than the smallest state. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII,
§ 1.
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1
651

Table 3
Though the total number of representatives is 651, rather than 655, this
is not a problem under the Webster Method. If the total number of
representatives does not come out to the pre-determined House size, no
refiguring is necessary. Alternatively, if the total number after rounding
had come to 660, the House would have 660 representatives. The Webster
Method allows a flexibility that does not exist in the Hill Method.
This basic arithmetic approach of the Webster Method is more
accessible to the general public than the complicated Hill Method. Even
Canada’s method of apportionment resembles Webster’s. A large part of
Canada’s apportionment method requires finding a quotient, dividing the
population by the quotient, and rounding up for decimals of 0.5 or
greater.161 The Webster Method, also known as the “Sainte-Lague”
method, is used in Germany, as well.162 It was used in the United States
from 1842–1852 and 1901–1941, and at least considered in the years in
between.163
Most importantly, the Webster method is considered to lack all bias.164
It is also unlikely to break quota.165 Balinski and Young argue that “it
should not be possible to transfer a seat from one state to another and bring
both nearer to their true quotas . . . [m]athematical analysis proves that the
only divisor method that meets this requirement is Webster’s.”166 The
method currently used, the Hill Method, is more likely to result in bias.167
For these reasons, Balinski and Young make a persuasive case for
returning to the Webster Method.
For purposes of efficiency, a requirement that apportionment be based
on the Webster Method should be part of the same new apportionment act
providing for a House size based on the Cubed Root Law.

161

The House of Commons and Its Members, supra note 47.
ELECTION OF MEMBERS AND THE ALLOCATIONS OF SEATS, DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, http://
www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/elections/arithmetic [http://perma.cc/MV7J-2KE8] (last visited
May 14, 2015).
163
A Little History, UNIV. ALA., http://www.ctl.ua.edu/math103/apportionment/apphisty.htm
[http://perma.cc/WL28-LJUD] (last visited Aug. 22, 2015).
164
BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 17, at 85; Paul H. Edelman, Getting the Math Right: Why
California Has Too Many Seats in the House of Representatives, 59 VAND. L. REV. 297, 340 (2006).
165
Edelman, supra note 164, at 339.
166
BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 17, at 85.
167
Id. at 86.
162
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B. My Proposals and the Constitutional Framework
The Constitution puts no maximum on the size of the House other than
that there cannot be more than one representative for every thirty thousand
people. Following the Cube Root Law could not mathematically result in a
violation of this requirement. In order to implement this change, only the
Apportionment Act of 1911 would have to be repealed, and a new
apportionment act passed. Webster’s method of apportionment has been
used before and no law currently forbids it from being used again.168 A
comprehensive new apportionment act would repeal Section 1 of the
Apportionment Act of 1911, require the number of representatives in the
House to reflect the cubed root of the population, and require usage of
Webster’s method for apportioning representatives. Should these methods
be implemented, Congress would currently have 676 representatives in the
House,169 with an average district size of 456,724.170 That is a 35.7%
increase in representation.171 Notably, the United Kingdom maintains a
lower chamber of 650 representatives for a population of only 64.1
million.172 Repealing Section 1 of the Apportionment Act of 1911 and
passing a new act increasing the size of the House to more adequately and
proportionally represent the people would allow a suffocating system to
breathe.
The Apportionment Act of 1911 consists of five parts.173 Section 1
mandates a cap on the House at 433 representatives, with Section 2
allowing for two more upon Arizona’s and New Mexico’s admittance to
the union.174 Section 3 requires that representatives “shall be elected by
districts composed of a contiguous and compact territory, and containing
as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants.”175 Section 4
provides that if a state’s number of representatives is increased, the
additional representatives will be elected at large until redistricting
occurs.176 Finally, Section 5 states that any representatives in the at-large
election will be nominated in the same manner as the governor.177
168
See A Little History, supra note 163 (providing a timeline of the use of each apportionment
method).
169
See supra note 154.
170
308,745,538 (population) divided by 676 (representatives) equals 456,724.17 people per
representative.
171
456,724.17 divided by 709,759.86 equals 64.35%. One hundred percent minus 64.35% equals
35.7%.
172
Population and Migration, OFF. FOR NAT’L STAT., http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guidemethod/compendiums/compendium-of-uk-statistics/population-and-migration/index.html [http://perma
.cc/Z6AK-2SWG] (last updated June 5, 2014).
173
Apportionment Act of 1911, ch. 5, 37 Stat 13.
174
Id. §§ 1–2.
175
Id. § 3.
176
Id. § 4.
177
Id. § 5.
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Section 1 shows apportionment, once again, being dictated by
politics—this time in a battle between urban and rural states.178 Gaughan
notes that “in the decade before the 1920 census, approximately six million
people moved from rural to urban areas.”179 As more people moved into
cities, and the nation changed from agrarian to urban, increasing the size of
the House threatened to reduce the power of rural states.180 Further, while
representatives cited a shortage of office space and supplies as reason to
halt the House’s growth, evidence suggests that this was not the case, and
in fact, the House ran more efficiently than the Senate.181
Sections 3 through 5 need not be altered for my proposal to take effect.
Only Section 1, imposing the first-ever cap on the number of House
representatives, should be repealed by a new apportionment act. The size
of the House of Representatives is important for more than just
congressional representation. There is also the matter of the Electoral
College. In the next Part I discuss the implications of my solution to the
Electoral College.
V. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND PROPORTIONALITY
The number of representatives apportioned to each state determines
that state’s voting power in the Electoral College. Currently, only two
small states, one generally conservative and one generally liberal, split
their Electoral College votes.182 In the spirit of proportional representation,
all states, and the District of Columbia, should split their Electoral College
votes based on the votes of the people.
A. Electoral College Vote-Splitting
Because electors are awarded based on a state’s number of senators
and representatives, the Electoral College can be viewed as an amalgam of
federalism and “majoritarianism.”183 This mirrors the nation’s
bicameralism and the Framers’ careful balancing of small and large states’
interests.
Each state’s Electoral College votes should be split in a manner that
178
See Christopher M. Straw, The Role of Electoral Accountability in the Madisonian Machine,
11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 339–41 (2008) (discussing the effect of the shift in rural to
urban domination in the 1920s).
179
Gaughan, supra note 25, at 1011.
180
See id. at 1011–12 (discussing the effects of a decreasingly rural nation on apportionment).
181
Straw, supra note 178, at 344–47.
182
See Split Electoral Votes in Maine and Nebraska, 270 TO WIN, http://www.270towin.com/
content/split-electoral-votes-maine-and-nebraska/#.VTMLzfDCfSM
[http://perma.cc/5J5G-YWLU]
(last visited May 7, 2015) (explaining the electoral process in both Maine and Nebraska).
183
Norman R. Williams, Reforming the Electoral College: Federalism, Majoritarianism, and the
Perils of Subconstitutional Change, 100 GEO. L.J. 173, 193 (2011). For a more robust defense of the
Electoral College, see generally id.
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reflects the state’s popular vote. For example, consider a state with twelve
votes, and its percentage of popular votes for the Democrats, Republicans,
and a third party, respectively, is 56 to 42 to 2. Those twelve votes would
be multiplied by each percentage, resulting in: 6.72 to 5.04 to 0.24, which
would leave the state with seven votes for the Democratic candidate, five
votes for the Republican candidate, and zero votes for the third party
candidate. Consider a state with seventy votes. Perhaps that state’s popular
vote for the Democrats, Republicans, and the third party, respectively, is
44 to 51 to 5. This would result in: 30.8 to 35.7 to 3.5. The Democratic
candidate would receive thirty-one votes, the Republican thirty-six, and the
third party three. (Since 0.8 and 0.7 are both greater than 0.5, the two extra
votes would be granted, one each, to the Republican and Democrat
candidates.)
1. Effect on States
Large blocs of votes have “power beyond [their] numbers.”184
Electoral College vote-splitting not only allows for greater equality in
interstate apportionment and representation, but it also allows minority
voters to feel like their votes matter, because they do.185 For example,
consider a state like Texas, with a traditionally Republican majority, or one
like California, with a traditionally Democratic majority. Democrats in
Texas and Republicans in California may feel like their votes do not count
or their voices are not heard.186 Allowing minority parties in heavily
Democratic or Republican states, like Texas or California, to garner
Electoral College votes will not only allow more citizens to feel
represented, but should make candidates care more about representing the
greatest number of people. Currently, neither party sees reason for
vigorous campaigning in heavily partisan states.187 But if the Republican
184

BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 17, at 9.
See, e.g., Benjamin A. Schoenkin, Proposed Bill Would Change Electoral Vote System in
Nebraska, DAILY NEBRASKAN (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.dailynebraskan.com/news/proposed-billwould-change-electoral-vote-system-in-nebraska/article_fee09204-acec-11e4-a446-fbd95a04c488.html
[http://perma.cc/DE86-LU2J] (emphasis added) (quoting a university history student expressing that a
winner-takes-all system in Nebraska will likely result in a decrease of young voter turnout).
186
See, e.g., Ina Jaffe, In California, “Republican” Is Becoming a Toxic Label, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/11/16/165216636/in-californiarepublican-is-becoming-a-toxic-label (discussing how California has become more Democratic over the
years, making it difficult for Republicans to win office); Bud Kennedy, For Texas Democrats, the Bad
News Gets Worse, STAR TELEGRAM (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.star-telegram.com/opinion/opncolumns-blogs/bud-kennedy/article3887266.html [http://perma.cc/NAT3-YHQ2] (discussing Texas’s
history of conservativism, and the difficulty securing Democratic wins).
187
During the 2012 presidential campaign, there were zero campaign stops in North Dakota or
Kansas; there were 45, 19, 52, and 25 in California, New York, Texas, and Massachusetts respectively;
and 115, 148, and 98 in Florida, Ohio, and Virginia, respectively. Presidential Campaign Stops: Who’s
Going Where, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/2012-presidentialcampaign-visits/ [http://perma.cc/NR66-3CBA] (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
185

624

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:595

candidate can snatch up some New York votes, both candidates are
incentivized to campaign in New York—the Republicans to grab as many
Electoral College votes as possible, and the Democrats to retain as many
Electoral College votes as possible.
Further, the hyper-focus on “battleground” states like Florida and Ohio
will wane. While candidates tend to spend a lot of time in these states,188
hoping to win even a slight majority of the large chunks of Electoral
College votes,189 they could be spending more time in states visited less
often, knowing that, for example, a state like Florida, with the fourth
highest Electoral College vote count, will dole out its votes to two or three
candidates, rather than as a winner-takes-all bloc. Rather than Florida
giving its entire bloc of votes to one candidate, its votes could be split
almost evenly. Because these states still offer high Electoral College vote
counts,190 they are not at risk of becoming altogether unimportant; rather,
their importance will more closely resemble traditionally more partisan
states.
Messy battles over small numbers of votes could also be curbed by
splitting Electoral College votes. In 2000, for example, though nearly six
million people voted in Florida, the difference between votes for Al Gore
and votes for George W. Bush was only 537. In my system, discussed in
Part V.A.4–5 below, Bush and Gore would both have received nineteen of
thirty-nine votes, leaving the final Electoral College vote for Ralph Nader,
who received a small portion of Florida’s vote. In this way, generally all
Floridians would have been represented in proportion to how they voted.
Instead, the battle over those 537 plus votes turned into a U.S. Supreme
Court case.191 Nine thousand votes in the liberal county of Miami-Dade
had gone uncounted due to voting machines not detecting a vote for
president.192 Another 110,000 were over-voted.193 That is not to say that
application of my solution would have stopped the recount or the Supreme
188

Id.
For example, despite Florida offering less Electoral College votes than California, Texas, and
New York, there were more than twice as many campaign stops in Florida than the latter states during
the 2012 presidential election. Id. There were 148 campaign stops in Ohio and 19 in Texas. Id.
190
For example, Florida currently has twenty-nine Electoral College votes. Distribution of
Electoral College Votes, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral
-college/allocation.html [http://perma.cc/4A6G-GCJ5] (last visited Aug. 22, 2015). Even if Florida’s
Electoral College votes were to be split in half, with the remainder going to a third party candidate,
each major party would still receive fourteen votes.
191
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (holding that Florida’s “safe harbor” recount
process was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause).
192
Id. at 102.
193
Id. at 108. An over-vote occurs “when a voter makes more than the permitted number of
selections in a single race/contest or when a voter makes a selection in a race/contest on which he/she
ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N,
was not eligible to vote.” Overvotes and Undervotes,
http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/AssetManager/2004%20EAVS%20Chapter%208.pdf [http://perma.cc/SU
47-CX6L] (internal quotation marks omitted).
189
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Court decision. Rather, the real benefit would be the splitting of the votes.
Giving all of Florida’s Electoral College votes to Bush ignored the wishes
of a nearly equal amount of Gore supporters. Because the Supreme Court
did not allow the recount to continue,194 we may never know the exact
amount of votes for each candidate. Given that Miami-Dade County leans
left,195 however, it would not be unreasonable to assume that the majority
of uncounted votes would have gone to Gore, propelling him ahead of
Bush and securing for him the large chunk of Florida Electoral College
votes which would have won him the election. In any event, had
everything gone the same except that my method had been used, the
Electoral College votes would have been split, and the controversy over the
large chunk of Florida votes going to the candidate who may not actually
have won Florida’s popular vote would not exist.
2. Increase in Third-Party Contenders
Later in this Part, I apply my method to the 1992 and 2000 elections.
One important result of this application is that, in 2000, the third-party
candidate would have won sixteen Electoral College votes (as opposed to
the zero that he actually won), and in the 1992 election, the third-party
candidate would have won just over eighteen percent of the Electoral
College vote, similar to the amount of the popular vote that he won.196
Nearly sixty percent of Americans feel that the two-party system is a
hindrance.197 If third parties could garner Electoral College votes, it might
open our system to more than just the two parties—both of which are
unpopular.198 Added competition could spur greater instances of debate and
194
See Bush, 531 U.S. at 111 (“Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are constitutional
problems with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court that demand a remedy.”).
195
See, e.g., Final Cumulative Report, MIAMI-DADE CNTY. ELECTIONS, http://www.miami
dade.gov/elections/results/ele110204/cumu110204.pdf [http://perma.cc/LED7-9H6Y] (last visited Aug.
22, 2015) (showing that John Kerry won 52.9% of the vote in Miami-Dade County in 2004); MiamiDade County Elections, CLARITY ELECTIONS, http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/FL/Dade/42008/
113201/en/summary.html [http://perma.cc/TRJ5-Q4SZ] (last updated Nov. 20, 2012) (showing that
Barack Obama won 61.58% of the vote in Miami-Dade County in 2012); Miami-Dade County
Elections, CLARITY ELECTIONS, http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/FL/Dade/8930/14419/en/summ
ary.html [http://perma.cc/7KXA-4BSR] (last updated Dec. 30, 2008) (showing that Barack Obama won
57.81% of the vote in Miami-Dade County in 2008).
196
See infra Part V.A.4. (showing that Ross Perot would have won 18.86% as a third-party
candidate in the 1992 presidential election).
197
Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Continue to Say a Third Political Party Is Needed, GALLUP (Sept.
24, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/177284/americans-continue-say-third-political-party-needed
.aspx.
198
In recent years, both parties have consistently had approval ratings of under fifty percent. See,
e.g., Andrew Dugan, Democratic Party Favorable Rating Falls to Record Low, GALLUP (Nov. 12,
2014),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/179345/democratic-party-favorable-rating-falls-record-low.aspx
2014 (noting that the Democratic Party’s favorable rating is at thirty-six percent and the Republican
Party’s favorable rating is at forty-two percent).

626

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:595

force candidates of the two major parties to listen more closely to the will
of the people, which they currently do not seem to do.199 Further, the
classic argument that voting for a third party is analogous to voting for the
candidate one likes least would hold less water if people see that thirdparty candidates truly have a chance of winning. If third parties can take
Electoral College votes away from the two major parties, Democrats and
Republicans would have to alter their platforms.200
Under the existing system, it is not surprising that many people who
would otherwise vote for a third party choose not to vote. Consider the
1992 election. Independent candidate Ross Perot received nearly twenty
percent of the popular vote, but zero Electoral College votes.201 That means
that almost one-fifth of the voting public wanted Perot for president, yet
that fifth of the country was not represented at all in the Electoral College.
Less egregious, but still inaccurate, was the election of 1912 when
Progressive candidate Theodore Roosevelt won almost 30% of the popular
vote, coming in second place, but only 16.6% of the Electoral College
vote.202 Conversely, Woodrow Wilson won 41.8% of the popular vote, but
a whopping 81.9% of the Electoral College vote.203 In 1992, Perot became
the most successful third-party candidate since Roosevelt, eighty years
earlier. Despite the popular opinion that third parties would benefit our
democratic system,204 no third-party candidate has recreated Roosevelt’s or
Perot’s success since.
3. Implementing Electoral College Vote-Splitting
Because each state determines how its electors are chosen and how
they are to vote,205 the states must choose Electoral College vote-splitting.
For reasons previously discussed, voters in states which generally go either
left or right would benefit from vote-splitting. If enough liberal- and
conservative-leaning states enact laws requiring vote-splitting, large swing

199
See, e.g., Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites,
Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSPS. ON POL. 564, 575 (“[T]he preferences of the average
American appear to have only a miniscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public
policy.”).
200
See Keith Darren Eisner, Comment, Non-Major-Party Candidates and Televised Presidential
Debates: The Merits of Legislative Inclusion, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 983–85 (1993) (discussing the
myriad ways third parties have influenced public policy, social change, and major party platforms).
201
Election of 1992, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection
.php?year=1992 [http://perma.cc/B64C-LYYP] (last visited May 8, 2015).
202
Election of 1912, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection
.php?year=1912 [http://perma.cc/56CK-XXWX] (last visited May 8, 2015).
203
Id.
204
Jones, supra note 197.
205
Who are the Electors?, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, http://www.archives.gov/federalregister/electoral-college/electors.html [http://perma.cc/7DY4-EU8J] (last visited May 7, 2015).
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206

Currently, two states—Nebraska and
states will eventually follow.
Maine—split their votes.207 In fact, despite being a generally conservative
state,208 Nebraska cast one of its Electoral College votes for Barack Obama
in 2008 when the Omaha area voted Democratic.209 Vote-splitting is not a
new experiment to these states, either; Nebraska’s law has required votesplitting since 1992, and Maine’s since 1972.210 In fact, three separate
attempts at overturning this method of voting have been defeated in
Nebraska.211 Because in sixty percent of states voters have changed their
choice of party in subsequent presidential elections,212 it is likely that these
states would see vote-splitting as beneficial. In the winner-takes-all system,
large states remain at a disadvantage, often going ignored by candidates.213
Nebraska provides an example of a small state that benefitted from votesplitting, since then-candidate Obama campaigned in a state that otherwise
would have gone ignored by a Democratic candidate.214 Because choosing
a proportional Electoral College vote system would increase the
representation of voters in every state, all fifty states and Washington, D.C.
should enact this method.
In the following two examples, I demonstrate how the 1992 and 2000
elections would have turned out had we used the Cube Root Law, the
Webster Method, and Electoral College vote-splitting.
4. The Presidential Election of 2000
The infamous 2000 presidential election resulted in a candidate being
elected to the presidency who did not win a majority or plurality of the
206
This is because swing states will become less important on the campaign trail if previously
conservative and liberal states can be split; there will be less emphasis on competing for swing state
votes if a conservative candidate can take votes from a liberal state (or a liberal candidate from a
conservative state).
207
Split Electoral Votes in Maine and Nebraska, supra note 182.
208
Walter Hickey, And Now Here Are the Most Conservative States in America . . ., BUS. INSIDER
(Feb. 4, 2013, 9:45 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/most-conservative-states-2013-2
[http://perma.cc/AS3G-QHWQ] (naming Nebraska as the ninth most conservative state).
209
Mitch Smith, Blue Dot for Obama Prompts Red Nebraska to Revisit Electoral College Rules,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2015, at A11.
210
Stacy Conradt, Why Do Nebraska and Maine Split Electoral Votes?, MENTAL FLOSS (Nov. 7,
2012, 1:30 PM), http://mentalfloss.com/article/13017/why-do-nebraska-and-maine-split-electoral-votes
[http://perma.cc/F2WX-8NA3].
211
Id.
212
Vincy Fon, Electoral College Alternatives and U.S. Presidential Elections, 12 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 41, 68 (2004).
213
See, e.g., Craig J. Herbst, Redrawing the Electoral Map: Reforming the Electoral College with
the District-Popular Plan, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 246 (2012) (noting that Texas has been ignored in
presidential campaigns since 1980).
214
See Jean Ortiz, Obama Wins Nebraska Electoral Vote, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 15, 2008, 5:12
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/11/14/obama-wins-nebraska-elect_n_143924.html [http://
perma.cc/545A-AQYN] (noting that the first time in history that Nebraska split its votes was also the
first time in forty-four years that a Democrat won one of its electoral votes).
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popular vote. In a survey taken seven years after the 2000 election,
seventy-two percent of respondents said they would support abolishing the
Electoral College in favor of a national popular vote.216
In 2000, Republican George W. Bush ran against Democrat Al Gore
and Green Party candidate Ralph Nader.217 Though Gore won the popular
vote by over half a million votes, Bush took the presidency by winning 271
Electoral College votes (as opposed to Gore’s 266).218 Despite nearly three
million people voting for him, Nader did not receive any Electoral College
votes.219
The 2000 census revealed a population of 281,421,906.220 Taking the
cubed root of that population results in a House of 655 representatives.221
The following table shows what the results would have been had my
proposal been implemented in 2000.
State
Ala.
Alaska
Ariz.
Ark.
Calif.
Colo.
Conn.
Del.
Fla.
Ga.

Bush
7
2
7
4
34
6
4
2
19
12

Gore Nader
5
0
1
0
6
1
4
0
43
3
5
1
6
0
2
0
19
1
9
0

State
Nebr.
Nev.
N.H.
N.J.
N.Mex.
N.Y.
N.C.
N.Dak.
Ohio
Okla.

Bush
4
4
3
9
3
16
12
2
14
6

Gore
2
3
2
12
3
28
9
1
13
4

Nader
0
0
0
1
0
2
0
0
1
0

215
See 2000 Presidential Election, Popular Vote Totals, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE,
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/2000/popular_vote.html
[http://perma.cc/
WYM7-CZGL] (last visited May 7, 2015) (showing that George W. Bush received 50,456,062 votes
and Al Gore received 50,996,582 votes).
216
WASH. POST KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HARV. UNIV., SURVEY OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENTS
12–13, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/interactives/independents/post-kaiser-harvardtopline.pdf [http://perma.cc/5G8P-VBT9] (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
217
2000 Official Presidential General Election Results, FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm [http://perma.cc/JSP8-NRWY] (last updated Dec.
2001). Other candidates will not be considered here, as they did not garner enough votes to have
received Electoral College votes.
218
2000 Presidential Election, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, http://www.archives.gov/federalregister/electoral-college/votes/2000.html [http://perma.cc/UYW3-UVDY] (last visited May 8, 2015).
219
2000 Presidential Popular Vote Summary for All Candidates Listed on at Least One State
Ballot, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/prespop.htm [http://perma.cc/9D
AT-4EEE] (last updated Dec. 2001) [hereinafter 2000 Presidential Popular Vote Summary]; Electoral
Vote Totals, 2000 Presidential Election, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, http://www.archives.gov/federalregister/electoral-college/votes/2000.html [http://perma.cc/ZBC4-QFFM] (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
220
Census 2000 Gateway, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/main/www/
cen2000.html [http://perma.cc/AZ8R-HSP5] (last visited May 8, 2015).
221
The cubed root of 281,421,906 is 655.318809119, which can be rounded down to 655.
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Hawaii
Idaho
Ill.
Ind.
Iowa
Kans.
Ky.
La.
Maine
Md.
Mass.
Mich.
Minn.
Miss.
Mo.
Mont.

2
3
13
9
4
5
6
6
2
6
6
12
6
5
8
3

3
2
17
7
5
3
5
6
3
8
10
13
6
4
7
1

0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0

Oreg.
Pa.
R.I.
S.C.
S.Dak.
Tenn.
Tex.
Utah
Vt.
Va.
Wash.
W.Va.
Wis.
Wyo.
DC
Total

5
14
1
6
2
8
30
5
1
10
7
3
7
2
0
367

5
16
3
5
2
7
20
2
2
8
8
3
7
1
3
369

629

0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
16

Table 4
As Table 4 shows, Gore would have won with a plurality of the
Electoral College votes, which matches his plurality win of the popular
vote. The third-party candidate, Nader, would also have had a chance to
win Electoral College votes. Nader won 2.74% of the popular vote.222
Under our current system, he was awarded zero Electoral College votes.223
Under my method, he would have won 2.13% of the Electoral College
votes. In the real 2000 election, Bush won 47.87% of the popular vote and
50.47% of the Electoral College vote.224 Gore won 48.38% of the popular
vote and 49.53% of the Electoral College vote.225 Under my method, Bush
would have received 48.8% of the Electoral College vote, and Gore the
remaining 49.07%. These results much more closely mirror the actual
election results and the will of the people. Gore’s plurality win in the
Electoral College would have matched his plurality success with the
popular vote.

222

2000 Presidential Popular Vote Summary, supra note 219.
Id.
224
Id.
225
Id.
223
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5. The Presidential Election of 1992
In 1992, Republican George H.W. Bush ran against Democrat Bill
Clinton and independent Ross Perot.226 Clinton won 43% of the popular
vote and 68.8% of the Electoral College vote.227 Bush won 37.4% of the
popular vote and 31.2% of the Electoral College vote.228 Perot won 18.9%
of the popular vote and zero Electoral College votes.229 If my method had
been in place at the time, the House would have had 635 representatives.230
Accounting for the Electoral College votes attributable to Senate seats, the
total Electoral College votes would have been 737. The following table
shows how, based on the 1992 popular vote, the Electoral College votes
would have been counted.
State Bush Clinton Perot State Bush Clinton Perot
Ala.
6
5
1 Nebr.
3
2
1
Alaska
1
1
1 Nev.
2
2
1
Ariz.
4
4
3 N.H.
2
2
1
Ark.
3
4
1 N.J.
9
10
3
Calif.
25
36
16 N.M.
2
3
1
Colo.
4
4
2 N.Y.
16
23
8
Conn.
4
4
2 N.C.
8
8
3
Del.
1
2
1 N.D.
2
1
1
Fla.
14
14
7 Ohio
11
12
6
Ga.
8
8
2 Okla.
4
4
2
Hawaii
2
2
1 Oreg.
3
4
2
Idaho
2
2
1 Pa.
12
14
6
Ill.
11
15
5 R.I.
2
2
1
Ind.
7
6
3 S.C.
5
5
1
Iowa
3
4
2 S.D.
2
1
1
Kans.
3
3
2 Tenn.
6
7
1
Ky.
5
5
1 Tex.
21
19
12
La.
5
6
2 Utah
3
1
2
Maine
1
2
2 Vt.
1
1
1
Md.
5
7
2 Va.
8
7
3
Mass.
5
8
4 Wash.
5
6
3
226
Robin Toner, The 1992 Elections: President—The Overview, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/04/us/1992-elections-president-overview-clinton-captures-presidenc
y-with-huge.html.
227
Election of 1992, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection
.php?year=1992 [http://perma.cc/S7CX-H57G] (last visited Aug. 11, 2015).
228
Id.
229
Id.
230
The cubed root of the 1990 population was 628.875, but the Webster Method would have
provided for 635 representatives.
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Mich.
Minn.
Miss.
Mo.
Mont.

10
4
4
5
1

11
6
4
7
2

5
3
1
3
1

W.V.
Wis.
Wyo.
DC
Total

3
5
1
0
279

3
6
1
3
319

631

1
3
1
0
139

Table 5
Under my method, the Electoral College votes would have more
closely matched the popular vote. Clinton still would have won the
presidency, as he won 43.28% of the Electoral College vote to Bush’s
37.86%. However, Perot would have won 18.86% of the Electoral College
vote, which more closely resembles the amount of the popular vote that
went in his favor.
With vote-splitting, however, plurality wins will become more likely to
occur. For this reason, the Twelfth Amendment should be reconsidered.
B. Amending the Constitution to Allow for Presidential Plurality Winners
The most difficult change to make would be to amend the Constitution
to allow for plurality vote winners. Because implementation of my
proposals would likely result in an increase in plurality wins, the
importance of allowing for plurality winners to take the presidency would
increase. The Twelfth Amendment requires a majority of Electoral College
votes for a presidential candidate to win.231 Should the Electoral College
not choose a majority, the choice of the next president would be in the
hands of the House of Representatives.232 Only three times in our nation’s
history has this occurred, and of those three times, only once did the
outcome reflect the votes of the people.
In 1800, Thomas Jefferson won the popular vote and defeated
incumbent John Adams in the Electoral College,233 but tied with his
running mate Aaron Burr for the Electoral College vote, due to electors
failing to distinguish between the offices of president and vice president on
their ballots.234 Though the Twelfth Amendment had yet to be

231

U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
Id.
233
Election of 1800, DUKE UNIV. LIBR., http://library.duke.edu/exhibits/sevenelections/elections/
1800/winner.html [http://perma.cc/9SQN-QJXT] (last visited May 7, 2015).
234
NAT’L ARCHIVES, TALLY OF ELECTORAL VOTES FOR THE 1800 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION,
http://www.archives.gov/global-pages/larger-image.html?i=/legislative/features/1800-election/images/
1800-election-l.jpg&c=/legislative/features/1800-election/images/1800-election.caption.html [http://per
ma.cc/9L6K-YG6Q] (last visited Dec. 1, 2015); Presidential Election of 1800: A Resource Guide,
LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/elections/election1800.html [http://perma.cc/
BL8L-T3QQ] (last visited May 7, 2015) [hereinafter Presidential Election of 1800].
232
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235

envisioned, Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution provided for a House
vote in the case of an Electoral College tie,236 and so the House chose the
third president—Thomas Jefferson.237 While, after long deliberation, the
House finally chose the candidate whom the people had elected,
partisanship controlled the discussion and the decisions of many
representatives, and the result could easily have been different.238
In 1824, Andrew Jackson won the popular vote and a plurality of
Electoral College votes.239 Yet, because of the Twelfth Amendment, the
House determined the next president of the United States.240 Speaker of the
House Henry Clay used his influence to ensure an Adams win, and in
return Adams made Clay his secretary of state.241 Despite Jackson’s
plurality wins in both the popular vote and the Electoral College, his
candidacy for president ended when the House chose John Quincy Adams
to be the sixth president.242
Though the presidential outcome of 1876 was not dictated by the
Twelfth Amendment, Congress determined the winner and nineteenth
president.243 Democrat Samuel Tilden won the popular vote.244 Due to
suspicions of unfairness in the election process, three states underwent
recounts.245 Rutherford B. Hayes needed all nineteen Electoral College
votes from the recounted states in order to secure the presidency.246 When
all nineteen votes were awarded to Hayes, the Democrats showed their
outrage by inaugurating their own governors and legislatures.247 Because
235
The election of 1800 was a large part of the reason for the creation of the Twelfth Amendment,
which was first proposed in 1803. Presidential Election of 1800, supra note 234.
236
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
237
Presidential Election of 1800, supra note 234.
238
Id. (“Still dominated by Federalists, the sitting Congress loathed to vote for Jefferson—their
partisan nemesis.”).
239
NAT’L ARCHIVES, LIST OF VOTES FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, AS COUNTED IN THE PRESENCE OF THE TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS, IN THE CHAMBER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ON WEDNESDAY, THE 9TH OF FEBRUARY, 1825, http://www.archives
.gov/education/lessons/electoral-tally/images/tally-1824.jpg [http://perma.cc/KD5F-3UC9] (last visited
Dec. 1, 2015); 1824 Presidential Election, 270 TO WIN, http://www.270towin.com/1824_Election/
[http://perma.cc/LP5L-969Y] (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
240
Under the Twelfth Amendment, any presidential vote resulting in a plurality win must go to
the House of Representatives. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
241
December 1, 1824: Presidential Election Goes to the House, HISTORY, http://www.hist
ory.com/this-day-in-history/presidential-election-goes-to-the-house
[http://perma.cc/ENS3-M9WN]
(last visited May 7, 2015).
242
Id.
243
The Disputed Election of 1876, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/
general-article/grant-election/ [http://perma.cc/6Y4M-23XZ] (last visited May 7, 2015).
244
Election of 1876, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection
.php?year=1876 [http://perma.cc/KCS9-2Y3N] (last visited May 7, 2015).
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The Disputed Election of 1876, supra note 243.
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the Constitution provided no guidance in such a matter, Congress created a
commission of ten congressmen and five Supreme Court justices to make a
determination.248 In the end, Southern Democrats made a deal with the
committee; in exchange for ending harsh Reconstruction policies, all
nineteen votes would go to Hayes, resulting in a total Electoral College
vote of 185–184, and a Hayes presidency.249 Though the 1876 election was
not governed by the Twelfth Amendment, leaving the decision in the hands
of Congress resulted in partisanship, and may or may not have ended with
the general electorate’s choice for president.
When an election goes to the House, each state and the District of
Columbia casts one vote for president.250 A candidate would need to win at
least twenty-six states in order to win the presidency. Given the extreme
partisanship in the House of Representatives, and the fact that in recent
years representatives have almost exclusively voted along party lines,251 it
follows that representatives would likely vote for the presidential candidate
from their own party.
Recall that, in 2000, Al Gore won the popular vote, but not the
presidency.252 A look at each states’ 2000 representatives’ parties reveals a
majority of Republican representatives in twenty-five states, a majority of
Democrat representatives in twenty-one states,253 and no majority in five
states. Had the 2000 Electoral College votes been split, without a
constitutional amendment repealing the majority vote requirement of the
Twelfth Amendment, the vote would have gone to the House, and Al Gore
would have won only if all five tie states had voted for him.
In fact, Democrats rely on larger states with higher Electoral College
votes, whereas Republicans rely on larger amounts of small states in
reaching for a majority. For example, Democrats often win states like
California, New York, New Jersey, and Illinois, which all have high
Electoral College vote counts. On the other side, Republicans rely on many
small states, such as Alaska, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, Utah,
and others to collectively contribute large amounts of Electoral College
votes. In 2008, John McCain won the Electoral College votes of twentytwo states, yet the final tally revealed an overwhelming win for Barack
248
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Id.
250
U.S. CONST. amend XII.
251
See Wesley Lowery, How Congress Became So Partisan, in 4 Charts, WASH. POST (Apr. 14,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/04/14/how-congress-became-morepartisan-over-time-in-four-charts [http://perma.cc/THJ9-CAB4] (mapping out the partisanship of
Congress from the late 1960s through the 2010s to show how Congress has grown more partisan over
time).
252
2000 Presidential Popular Vote Summary, supra note 219.
253
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Obama, with 365 Electoral College votes to McCain’s 173. McCain took
much of the South and the Midwest, resulting in a high state count voting
in his favor, but a much smaller collective Electoral College vote count.255
While the Electoral College exists to vote for the candidate most
desired by the electorate of each state,256 House representatives exist to
represent their respective constituencies, not the state as a whole.257 Even
if, alternatively, representatives were to vote for the Electoral College
winner of their state, Democrats would find it difficult, if not impossible,
to win any presidency left to the House. Under my proposal, in the 2000
election Democrats would have won fifteen states; Republicans would
have won twenty-five; and eleven states would have no majority. So, for
Al Gore , who won the popular vote, to win, he would have to win every
single non-majority state.
To allow the House to determine the president is to go against the “one
person one vote” standard enunciated in Wesberry.258 While voters in
Rhode Island counting for 1.88 times voters in Montana is egregious and
contrary to Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, allowing each state’s
representatives to cast one vote for president would be many times more
unfair to voters. California, with a population of nearly forty million,
would cast one vote for president; Wyoming, with a population of just over
half a million would also cast one vote for president. That means that
Wyoming voters would count for more than sixty-seven times California
voters.
Because this change is so important to our election system, a
constitutional amendment is appropriate. The amendment would only have
to change the following lines of the Twelfth Amendment:
The person having the greatest number of votes for President,
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the
whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have
such majority, then from the persons having the highest
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as
President, the House of Representatives shall choose
254
Election for the Fifty-Sixth Term, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, http://www.archives.gov/federalregister/electoral-college/votes/2000_2005.html#2008 [http://perma.cc/ARK3-EQ9J] (last visited May
7, 2015).
255
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House of Representatives, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (July 2009), http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/
federalelections2008.pdf [http://perma.cc/K36Z-GJLF].
256
Who Are the Electors?, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, http://www.archives.gov/federalregister/electoral-college/electors.html [http://perma.cc/L3RW-GT5H] (last visited May 7, 2015).
257
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c/48E7-D7LL] (last visited May 14, 2015) (discussing the role of the Senate).
258
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immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the
President, the votes shall be taken by states, the
representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for
this purpose shall consist of a member or members from twothirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be
necessary to a choice.259
Congress should pass such an amendment to make sure their
constituents are adequately represented. However, should my other
proposals be implemented, elections will become more fair and
representative even without this constitutional amendment.
C. My Proposals and the Constitutional Framework
Unlike with my two core proposals, the states must support Electoral
College vote-splitting and amending the Constitution. Each state will have
to choose Electoral College vote-splitting in its own turn. However, nonswing states are incentivized to do so,260 and once enough of these states
choose vote-splitting, swing states will be incentivized to follow.261
Because the Constitution expressly allows for states to choose their
electors,262 and each state may choose its method of Electoral College
voting, and two states have already successfully done so, no constitutional
challenge to states making this decision exists.
Finally, part of the Twelfth Amendment would have to be repealed by
a new constitutional amendment in order to allow for plurality winners.
While passing a constitutional amendment is not as easy as passing a
statute, Congress has reason to take up this cause. Though the House of
Representatives would technically be giving up a power, it is a power that
has scarcely been used. Further, both parties have cause to want to avoid a
House vote. Should there be more Democratic representatives during a
presidential vote sent to the House, Republicans will likely lose the
presidency, even if they win the plurality or popular vote. The same goes
for a House controlled by Republican representatives and a Democratic
plurality winner. States should ratify such an amendment because it is in
the best interest of their constituents.
The Framers agreed during the Great Compromise that the House of
Representatives should be proportional. For this proportionality, small
states took disproportionate representation in the Senate.263 Wyoming,
259
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population 563,626, and California, population 37,253,956, each have two
senators.264 It is because the House is supposed to be proportional that
California having sixty-six times the population of Wyoming, yet the same
number of senators, is permissible. But when the House is capped at 435
representatives, a growing amount of proportionality is lost. For these
reasons, the vote should not go to the House, and the Twelfth Amendment
should be amended to allow for plurality winners.
My proposal is summarized as follows: (1) Congress passes a statute
repealing the Apportionment Act of 1911 and providing for a House with
as many representatives as the cubed root of the population; (2) requiring
usage of the Webster Method of apportionment; (3) states choose to split
their Electoral College votes proportionally; and (4) Congress proposes
and the states ratify a constitutional amendment nullifying the part of the
Twelfth Amendment that requires a majority Electoral College vote for any
candidate to win the presidency. To see how this might work, Part V.A.5
above applies my plan to the controversial 2000 presidential election.
VI. CONCLUSION
Though, in the strictest sense, applying “one person one vote” to
interstate apportionment is unlikely to happen, apportionment procedure
should at least strive towards that goal. The Framers believed in a larger
House so that constituents might be adequately represented. Because the
Electoral College is based on apportionment, it is imperative that
proportionality, accuracy, and fairness dominate the process.
Using the Cubed Root Law will increase the size of the House by over
two hundred representatives, which will help to create district sizes in each
state closer to the average. Using the Webster Method will increase
accuracy in apportionment. States choosing to split Electoral College votes
will result in presidential elections that more closely reflect the will of the
people. And amending the Constitution to change the majority requirement
of the Twelfth Amendment will ensure that the candidate with the highest
vote count wins.
The Court should not hesitate to take up the issue of interstate
apportionment. So far it has already found that disparities between in-state
district sizes are unconstitutional. Their justification for this finding also
applies to interstate apportionment. House representatives could only
benefit their constituents by making these proposed changes to the law and
to the Constitution. Creating a better-represented electorate will help to
ensure the right outcomes in presidential elections.
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Id.; Resident Population Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/2010census/
data/apportionment-pop-text.php [http://perma.cc/EN6H-5QAC] (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).

